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PICKETING AND PUBLICITY UNDER SECTION 8(b)(4)
OF THE LMRA*
IN two recent decisions - NLRB v. Servette, Inc.' and NLRB v. Local
760, Fruit Packers 2 - the Supreme Court sought to resolve several of the
major problem areas created by the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments 3 to
the secondary boycott provisions contained in Section 8(b) (4) of the Taft-
Hartley Act.4 These amendments culminated a congressional effort begun in
1947 to prohibit union pressure on employers not directly involved in a labor
dispute between the union and the primary employer. In 1947 Congress, be-
lieving that unions had abused the power given to them by the Wagner Act
of 1935,1 enacted the Taft-Hartley Act as a corrective. One of the prime
targets of this legislation was the highly effective secondary boycott.0 Such a
boycott was used frequently against Employer A, an important customer or
supplier of Employer B, the employer with whom the union had its primary
dispute. A's employees would be induced to strike until A severed business
relations with B, thereby forcing B to succumb to the union's demands. Al-
though A, the secondary employer, aided B, the primary employer, by con-
tinuing to deal with him, Congress felt the secondary employer was too remote
from the primary labor dispute to justify union pressure against him. 7 To
eliminate such pressure, the Taft-Hartley Act outlawed as an unfair labor
*The Editors of the Journal wish to express their appreciation to Professor Harry
H. Wellington, for his assistance and for calling to their attention this Note, originally
written as a divisional paper in the Labor Division.
1. 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
2. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
3. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542-
43 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
4. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, § 8(b) (4), 61 Stat. 141-42 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as LMRA].
5. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 639,
Drivers Union (Curtis), 362 U.S. 274, 285-90 (1960) ; Local 1976, United Bhd. of Car-
penters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93, 98-100 (1958).
6. See, e.g., statement by Senator Taft, sponsor of the bill, during debate:
It has been set forth that there are good secondary boycotts and bad secondary
boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having
anyone tell us any difference between different kinds of secondary boycotts. So we
have so broadened the provision dealing with secondary boycotts as to make them
an unfair labor practice.
93 Coxr.. REc. 4198 (1947).
Senator Taft also noted the provision to be "an extremely important one." 93 CoNqG.
REc. 3838 (1947). See also H.R. REp. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947) ; Mulroy,
The Taft-Hartley Act in Action, 15 U. CHL L. REv. 595, 596 (1948).
7. See, e.g., remarks of Senator Taft, 93 CONG. REc. 3838 (1947) ; 93 CONG. REc.
4198 (1947) ; Senator Ellender, 93 CONG. REc. 4131-32 (1947).
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practice union activity consisting of two elements: where the union by its
conduct did
engage in, or... induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employ-
ment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work
on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any ser-
vices... 8
and where an object of such conduct was
forcing or requiring .. .any employer or other person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business
with any other person .... 9
Soon, however, unions found new methods of accomplishing the prohibited
"object" without running afoul of the "conduct" proscription. One such
method was to bring pressure directly against the secondary employer; for
example, by use of an overt threat or consumer picketing, while at the same
time insuring that none of his employees would be unlawfully induced.10 An-
other method was to direct activity toward individuals who did not fall with-
in the statutory definition of "employees" of any "employer.""
n
It was in part the desire to outlaw these methods of evasion which prompted
Congress to include amendments of the secondary boycott provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act in the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Bill.'2 The conduct portion of
Section 8(b) (4), now divided into two clauses, continued to prohibit induce-
ment and encouragement in the new subsection (i), but substituted "any in-
dividual employed by any person" for "the employees of any employer." A new
subsection (ii) was added prohibiting conduct which would "threaten, coerce,
8. LMRA §8(b)(4).
9. LMRA §8(b) (4) (A).
10. See, e.g., Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357
U.S. 93 (1958); NLRB v. Business Mach. Mechanics Bd., 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956) ; Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906, 911-12 (2d Cir. 1952) ;
Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. Rzv.
1086, 1113 (1960).
11. In, determining whether the inducement of "employees of any employer" violated
§ 8(b) (4), the Board looked to the statutory definitions of "employee" and "employer"
and excluded the conduct from the prohibition of the act if either the secondary employer
or his employees were not covered by the definition. Thus "employer" does not include
federal or state governments or subdivisions and agencies thereof, non-profit hospitals, or
persons subject to the Railway Labor Act. LMRA § 2(2). "Employee" excludes super-
visors, agricultural workers, and workers employed by an employer subject to the Rail-
way Labor Act. LMRA § 2(3). A union could, therefore, apply otherwise unlawful pres-
sure against these several classes of employees. See Note, The Landrum-Griffn Amend-
ments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 736-37 (1960) and
cases cited therein,; Aaron supra note 10.
12. See analysis by Representative Griffin, 105 CoNG. REc. 14347 (1959), reprinted
in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND Dis-
cLOSuRE AcT OF 1959, 1522-23 (1959) [hereinafter cited as LEGIs. HIsT.]; remarks by
Representative Rhodes, 105 CONG. Rc. 15544-45 (1959), 2 LEGIs. HISM. 1581 (1959);
remarks by Senator Goldwater, 105 CONG. REc. 19771 (1959), 2 LEGis. HIST. 1857 (1959).
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or restrain any person ;" thus, conduct directed toward anyone outside the scope
of (i) might still be subject to the prohibition of (ii).13 In addition, Congress
attached a proviso exempting "publicity, other than picketing" from the re-
strictions of subsections (i) and (ii).14 These new provisions - inartistically
drawn and a product of compromise 15 - have given rise during their five
year history to several problems with respect to permissible union conduct
and have led, in turn, to considerable litigation with resultant conflicts in the
decisions of various courts and the National Labor Relations Board. While
Servette and Fruit Packers were the first Supreme Court cases dealing with
these amendments, neither case fully resolved the problems presented by the
amendments,1 and Fruit Packers seems to have created more problems than
it resolved.
13. Subsection (ii) of 8(b) (4) applies to "any person." Section 2 of the act defines
person to include "one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations,
corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers." LMRA
§ 2(1). Under subsection (i) of 8(b) (4), however, the "individual" must be "employed
by any person." Although everyone who is an "individual" under (i) will of necessity
also be a "person" under (ii), a union's conduct may violate (i) without violating (ii) ;
for while an inducement is sufficient for a violation of (i), any pressure short of a threat,
coercion, or restraint is permissible under (ii). For an example of the slight amount of
pressure required to constitute an inducement, see Local 294, Sheet Metal Workers (S.M.
Kisner), 131 N.L.R.B. 1196 (1961), where a violation of (i) was found when a union
representative told an "individual" that the union "wished" that a contract would not be
awarded to a certain employer.
14. LMRDA § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542-43 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. IV,
1963). By its terms the proviso exempts conduct constituting "publicity, other than picket-
ing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public [of a] primary dispute" from both
(i) and (ii). See text at note 32 infra. In reality, however, it does not seem to afford
exemption for such publicity as induces or encourages within the scope of subsection
(i), for the proviso is limited by a phrase couched in words almost identical to the lan-
guage of (i) :
... as long as such publicity does not have an, effect of inducing any individual
employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his
employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform
any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution....
Any conduct violating (i) would seem to fall within this phrase and therefore be outside
the proviso's exemption.
15. See Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
HARv. L. Rxv. 1086, 1114 (1960); Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. Rnv. 257, 273-74 (1959). Cf. Senator Ken-
nedy's remarks, 105 CONG. Rzc. 17898-99 (1959), 2 LEGIs. HIST. 1432 (1959).
16. E.g., where is the line drawn between "threaten, coerce, or restrain" in subsection
(ii) and lesser forms of persuasion? See, Local 901, Teamsters Union v. Compton, 291
F.2d 793, 797 (1st Cir. 1961). Does consumer picketing per se violate subsection (i)?
Compare Local 61, Upholsterers Workers (Minneapolis House Furnishing), 132 N.L.R.B.
40, 43-44 (1961), with Burr & Perfection Mattress & Spring Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d, 612,
617-22 (5th Cir. 1963). May a union use force prohibited by (i) or (ii) to obtain or
enforce a hot cargo agreement made legal by the construction industry exemption to the
general prohibition, contained in § 8(e) of the amended LMRA? Is such an agreement
enforceable in court? See, Local 383, Construction Laborers v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th
Cir. 1963); Note, 39 Nora DA-A LAw. 220 (1964).
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In Servette a distributor of specialty food merchandise filed a complaint
with the NLRB alleging in part that the union had violated subsection (i) of
Section 8(b) (4) by inducing and encouraging managers of supermarkets to
cease handling Servette's merchandise. The Board, rejecting this allegation,
found the supermarket managers not to be "individuals" within the scope of
(i).17 The Board based this finding on its holdings in two previous decisions,18
in which it had reasoned that an interpretation of the phrase "individual em-
ployed by any person" to include everyone employed by another would render
(ii) largely insignificant.' 9 The Board felt such a view should not be ascribed
to Congress without convincing evidence of an intended broad scope for (i),
and the Board discovered no legislative history indicating that Congress had,
in fact, meant (i) to have such wide application. On the contrary, the Board
found evidence that the purpose of substituting "individual" for "employee"
in subsection (i) was to avoid the problems created by the Taft-Hartley
definition of employee and to include within the "inducement" prohibition
lower echelon supervisory personnel, thought to be readily subject to union
pressure.20 Thus the Board in Servette placed only those employees exercis-
ing no managerial discretion or those who by work, association or interest
are closely aligned with the rank-and-file within the statutory category of "in-
dividual" created by subsection (i).21
Although not clearly articulated by the Board, this rationale seems con-
sistent with another major congressional purpose represented by (i) - pre-
venting the disruption of the secondary employer's business.2 2 "Individual"
as interpreted by the Board seems to include only those most likely to cause
17. Local 848, Wholesale Delivery Drivers Union (Servette, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B.
1501 (1961).
18. Local 505, Teamsters Union (Carolina Lumber Co.), 130 N.L.R.B. 1438, 1444
(1961) ; Local 61, Upholsterers Workers (Minneapolis House Furnishing), 132 N.L.R.B.
40, 43 (1961).
19. Since even corporate officers would be employed by a "person," see note 13 supra,
thereby falling within (i), only a partner or proprietor of a business would be included
within (ii) and not (i). Thus unless "refusal . . . to perform any services" in (i)
is read so as not to include the exercise of discretion, any threat under (ii) directed to-
ward a corporate officer would necessarily also constitute an unlawful inducement under
(i). This interpretation of "perform any services" was given by the Supreme Court in
Servette, reversing the Ninth Circuit's contrary reasoning. See text at and following note
46 infra.
20. See, e.g., the analysis by Representative Thompson and Senator Kennedy, 105
CONG. REc. 16589 (1959), 2 LEGIs. HIST. 1707 (1959), and remarks by Senator Morse,
105 Co G. REc. 17882-83 (1959), 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1426 (1959).
21. 133 N.L.R.B. at 1501-02.
22. The language of subsection (i) prohibits inducement or encouragement of "a
strike or a refusal ... to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or
work on' any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services . . "
All of these activities relate to a disruption at the secondary site, although the general
purpose of the entire § 8(b) (4) (i), (ii) (B) is to preserve the business relationship be-
tween the primary and secondary employers.
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such a disruption, should they comply with union wishes. Action by higher
ranking supervisory employees would have a less disruptive effect; even if
these employees complied with union demands, their ability to exercise choice
among competing suppliers or products would enable them to continue to per-
form their normal services. For example, the managers in Servette had pur-
chasing discretion, and they could easily have bought other distributors' prod-
ucts without disrupting their employer's business, much the same as can a
proprietor who unquestionably is not an "individual" within the scope of
(i).23
Although the Board's interpretation was a reasonable adaptation of congres-
sional intent, it was rejected on appeal by the Ninth Circuit.24 The court held
that an "individual" under subsection (i) included everyone employed by an-
other. This conclusion was based on the literal language of (i) and was sup-
ported by the feeling that a narrower reading would place unions in the un-
tenable position of having to determine whether an employee was within or
without the scope of (i) before inducing or encouraging him.2 5 This rationale,
however, appears inadequate. While it is true that a narrower reading of (i)
would introduce uncertainty with respect to which employees are "individ-
uals," it would seem that any union would be willing to assume this risk in
return for the greater freedom of action it would gain in being permitted to
apply all pressure short of threats, coercion, and restraint to more people.
The Supreme Court on certiorari attempted to reconcile this felt need for
certainty with the manifest legislative intent to restrict the scope of subsection
(i) by holding that although everyone employed by another is an "individual,"
the union,
in asking the managers not to handle Servette items, was not attempting
to induce or encourage them to cease performing their managerial duties
in order to force their employers to cease doing business with Servette.
Rather, the managers were asked to make a managerial decision which
the Board found was within their authority to make.28
The Court's approach to the interpretation of (i) includes all employees with-
in the scope of the subsection but concentrates on whether an inducement to
withhold services has in fact occurred; in contrast the Board's interpretation
concentrates on the scope and definition of "individual employed by any per-
son." While the interpretation of the Board and the Court differ, the results
reached will normally coincide, as was the case in Servette. However, cases
may arise in which the interpretations will lead to conflicting results. Thus
while a shipping clerk may have authority to decide which carrier to use, his
lower echelon status, his salary, and his closeness to the rank-and-file, would,
23. An "individual" must be "employed by any person" under subsection (i).
24. Servette, Inc. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962).
25. Id. at 665-67.
26. 377 U.S. at 50-51.
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under the Board's interpretation, make his inducement a violation of (i).27
Under the Supreme Court's interpretation, on the other hand, his discretion
alone would apparently require a finding that (i) had not been violated.28
Since Congress was in part concerned with restricting the union's power to
persuade or dominate lower rank supervisors, who are often present or former
union members and therefore readily susceptible to union pressure and dis-
cipline, the Board's view seems more consistent with legislative intent.29 How-
ever, the term "managerial discretion," left undefined by the Court in its sub-
section (i) interpretation, may be read as including a consideration of the
remuneration, function, responsibility and hierarchical status of the individual
involved, as well as his authority to make independent decisions. In order to
fully effectuate congressional intent while remaining faithful to the holding of
the Supreme Court, the Board in the future might seize upon these definitional
possibilities and take a broad view of the term "managerial discretion."
The Court, in addition to deciding the inducement issue under subsection
(i), also dealt with the second question raised by Servette's complaint - that
the union's distribution of handbills to supermarket customers asking them
not to purchase Servette products constituted a threat, coercion, or restraint
of the handbilled employer in violation of subsection (ii) of Section 8(b) (4).
27. Local 294, Teamsters Union (Van. Transport Lines), 131 N.L.R.B. 242 (1961).
The Board, when it first determined the scope of subsection (i), stated that no single
factor would determine the category in which one belongs, but it did enumerate those
factors it would consider most important:
(1) The organizational set-up of the employer.
(2) The authority, responsibility, and background of the supervisor involved.
(3) The supervisor's working conditions, duties, and functions on the job involved.
(4) The salary, earnings, perquisites, and benefits received by the supervisor.
Local 505, Teamsters Union (Carolina Lumber Co.), 130 N.L.R.B. 1438, 1444 (1961).
In applying the guidelines to specific situations, the Board and courts have found the
following are not "individuals" and therefore are beyond the scope of (i) : an officer of a
corporation or a partner of a partnership, NLRB v. Local 294, Teamsters Union, 298
F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1961), affirming and enforcing Van Transport Lines, supra, and Local
299, Sheet Metal Workers (S.M. Kisner), 131 N.L.R.B. 1196 (1961); the manager of a
large corporation's only outlet in the particular area, Local 901, Teamsters Union (Edito-
rial "El Imparcial," Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 895 (1961) ; job supervisors or superintendents
who are top management representatives and who have discretionary authority over sub-
contractors, Alpert v. Local 379, Teamsters Union, 184 F. Supp. 558 (D. Mass. 1960) ;
S.M. Kisner, supra; Local 324, Operating Engineers (Brewer's City Coal Dock), 131
N.L.R.B. 228 (1961) ; and sales and retail store managers, Local 61, Upholsterers Work-
ers (Minneapolis House Furnishing), 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961); Local 848, Wholesale
Delivery Drivers (Servette, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1501 (1961). On the other hand an esti-
mator with limited authority in taking jobs off prints and in placing employees on jobs,
S.M. Kisner, supra, and a foreman, in charge of routing trucks, NLRB v. Local 294,
Teamsters Union, supra (Board and court), were held to be "individuals" within the
meaning of § 8(b) (4) (i).
28. See, e.g., discussion at note 26 supra.
29. See authorities cited in note 20 supra. In addition, this view seems consistent with
purpose manifest in the structure of subsection (i) - to minimize disruption of the sec-
ondary employer's business. See notes 22 and 23 supra and accompanying text.
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Although the Board assumed that the handbilling did in fact threaten, coerce,
or restrain, it found no violation of 8(b) (4), reasoning that under the pub-
licity proviso such conduct was exempt from the proscriptions of the section. 0
The publicity proviso 31 states that:
nothing contained in [§ 8(b) (4)] shall be construed to prohibit pub-
licity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that
a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor
organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another em-
ployer....82
The Ninth Circuit, however, found the publicity proviso of no help to the
union, since it interpreted the phrase "products . . . produced" to refer to
fabricated articles only and thus held that the proviso did not protect Servette ,
30. Local 848, Wholesale Delivery Drivers (Servette, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1501, 1502
(1961), basing its decision on Local 537, Teamsters Union, (Lohman Sales Co.), 132
N.L.R.B. 901 (1961).
31. LMRDA § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542-43 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. IV,
1963).
32. 73 Stat. 542-43 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (Supp. IV, 1963) (emphasis
added). This proviso did not originally appear in either the House or the Senate bill;
rather, it first appeared in the bill which emerged from the conference and which Congress
finally enacted. The Senate conferees feared that the House version, containing clause (ii)
but no proviso, would he construed to outlaw all forms of consumer publicity and boy-
cotts. The House conferees had meant clause (ii) only to protect secondary employers
from direct union pressure, apparently not realizing its potential broad effect. They were
willing to protect limited publicity and consumer boycotts as long as picketing was not
included within the proviso's protection. Therefore the proviso was born. See Aaron, The
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HAv. L. REv. 1086, 1114
(1960); Note, The Landrun-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boy-
cott, 45 CONN. L.Q. 724, 731, 759; compare Senator Kennedy's remarks, 105 CoNG.
REc. 17898-99 (1959), 2 LEGIs. HIST. 1432 (1959). Professor Archibald Cox, who par-
ticipated in the drafting of the final version of the act, explained the existence of the
proviso in this manner:
There is some reason to think that originally the Republicans and Southern
Democrats among the House conferees failed to realize -that the words [of clause
(ii)] were broad enough to reach consumer boycotts and would have agreed to
eliminate the prohibition, but President Eisenhower's radio and television appear-
ance placed them in a dilemma. The speech contained an example of secondary
picketing which had either to be read as an inducement of employees to engage in
a secondary strike, in which case the President has displayed ignorance by demand-
ing that Congress outlaw conduct which had been unlawful for twelve years, or as
a demand for a law against picketing which caused a secondary consumer boycott
The sponsors of the Landrum-Griffin bill stood immovably upon the second alterna-
tive. The Senate conferees, therefore, sought to narrow the restriction to the exact
illustration used by the President. This is the reason for the proviso, which permits
... every other form of publicity except picketing.... I suspect that the distinction
between signal and publicity picketing [in § 8(b) (7)] would also have been intro-
duced if it were not for the curious turn of events which made this politically im-
possible for the sponsors of the Landrum-Griffin amendments.
Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MixN.
L. REv. 257, 274 (1959).
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a distributor rather than a fabricator. 33 But as the Board reasoned, "products
• . . produced" may also refer in a broader sense to all the results of labor,
thereby encompassing the addition of intangible services to a previously fab-
ricated product.3 In fact this definition of "products . . . produced" appears
most consistent with the purpose of the proviso - to protect union activity
"truthfully advising the public.. ." - for there is no reason to distinguish
advice on product disputes from advice on service disputes.35 The legislative
debates, moreover, refer to publicity in general, indicating no distinction be-
tween objects of publicity to be protected by the proviso.3 6 Basing its holding
33. 310 F.2d 659, 667 (9th Cir. 1962). The court relied on its previous decision in
Great Western Broadcasting Co. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1962), in which it held
that non-picketing publicity of a primary dispute with a television station was not pro-
tected by the proviso.
34. The Board first formulated its basic rationale in Local 537, Teamsters Union
(Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961), where it stated:
Here the issue revolves around the meaning of two words, "product" and "pro-
duced." Apparently, our dissenting colleague believes that a "product" can only
be a material object and can be "produced" only by one who physically engenders
it The natural meaning of these two words, however, cannot be so limited. Web-
ster's defines "product" as: "Anything produced, as by generation, growth, labor
or thought...."
From the foregoing it seems clear that, so far as human effort is concerned,
Labor is the prime requisite of one who produces .... If our dissenting colleague
is right, vast numbers of our working population produce nothing. Their thought,
labor, or business enterprise is not a "product." We do not believe that the plain
meaning of the words "product" and "produced" requires the Board to draw an
uncertain line between those employers engaged essentially or only incidentally in
the fabrication of products; between those employers who create a new product or
embellish an old one; between products of imagination and those that can be seen,
touched, or smelled.
Id., at 906-07.
35. One New York Court of Appeals decision, upholding peaceful product picketing
because of a "unity of interest" between the secondary and primary employers, indicated
in a dictum that a union could not picket to persuade the public to withdraw patronage
generally. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 286, 11 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1937). A later
decision, however, upheld the right to picket a store with a burglar alarm serviced by a
non-union company, finding the "unity of interest" in the continuing relationship between
secondary and primary employer. People v. Muller, 286 N.Y. 281, 36 N.E.2d 206 (1941).
The only case in which services picketing would not be allowed is that in which the sec-
ondary employer no longer uses the primary employer's services. See People v. Bellows,
281 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E.2d 238 (1939). Thus, as the New York court recognized, a secondary
employer is taking sides with and aiding a primary employer by using his services just
as much as he would be by purchasing his goods for resale.
36. Thus Senator Kennedy, leader of the Senate conferees and one of the drafters of
the proviso, explained the proviso to his colleagues in these terms:
We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front of
that secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree that the union
shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing. In other words,
the union can hand out handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in news-
papers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carry on all publicity short
of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site.
105 CONG. REc. 17898-99 (1959), 2 LEGIs. HIsT. 1432 (1959). Other such remarks:
"What was permitted was the giving out of handbills or information through the radio,
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in part on this reasoning, the Supreme Court approved the Board's position
in Servette and accepted the broad definition of "products . . . produced." 7
Another problem present in the publicity proviso, not raised by Servette
but analogous to the "products ... produced" question, is the interpretation
of the word "distributed." This question is illustrated by a recent case in
which the Board under the publicity proviso upheld union activity informing
the customers of a supermarket chain that the chain was using the services
of a refrigeration company employing non-union plumbers.38 In order for the
Board to reach this result, it had to assume that the supermarket was dis-
tributing the services of the refrigeration company. Although this seems a
strained reading of "distributed," it accords with the legislative purpose to
enable the public to receive information relevant to labor disputes and is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the proviso in Ser-
vette.3
9
Yet another consideration militates toward a liberal interpretation of the
publicity proviso and supports the current view of the Board and the Supreme
Court regarding "products . . . produced . . . and . .. distributed. . .".. Al-
though the Supreme Court did not consider the issue in Servette, a narrow
reading of the publicity proviso would have raised a first amendment ques-
tion. If publicity concerning a labor dispute involving non-fabricated or non-
distributed products were not protected, it would fall within the prohibition
of (ii) if it threatened, coerced or restrained an employer.40 Publicity may
take the form of newspaper, television, or radio advertising, and as such
would apparently be an exercise of free speech. Although the Court has not
dealt with the constitutional status of advertising related to labor disputes, its
recent decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,4 1 holding a non-commercial
newspaper advertisement to be protected by the first amendment, leaves little
doubt that such labor advertising would also be within the scope of the first
and so forth." (Senator Kennedy) 105 CoNG. REc. 17720 (1959), 2 LEGis. HisT. 1389
(1959). "Hence, the amendments adopted in conference ... protect the free speech right
to appeal to customers by non-picketing methods." (Representative Udall) 105 CoNG.
REc. 18135 (1959), 2 LEGIs. HisT. 1722 (1959). There were some scattered references to
"goods" with respect to the publicity proviso, but it appears that the term was used as
part of a general example of a consumer boycott. See e.g., remarks of Senator Kennedy,
105 CONG. REc. 17327 (1959), 2 LEois. HisT. 1377 (1959) ; remarks of Senator Morse,
105 CONIG. REC. 17882-83 (1959), 2 LEafs. HIST. 1426 (1959). In addition Professor Cox
indicated that no distinction was intended. See his statement quoted in note 32 supra.
37. 377 U.S. at 55.
38. Local 142, Plumbers Union (Shop-Rite Foods, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 307 (1961).
39. Thus the Supreme Court in Servette stated:
The proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern that the unions' free-
dom to appeal to the public for support of their case be adequate safeguarded....
It would fall far short of achieving this basic purpose if the proviso applied only in
situations where the union's labor dispute is with the manufacturer or processor.
377 U.S. at 55.
40. See, e.g., Servette, Inc. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962); Local 537,
Teamsters (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961).
41. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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amendment.42 Even if such publicity had the effect proscribed by (ii), it would
seem, under established Supreme Court interpretation of the first amendment,
to be protected. The Court in Thornhill v. Alabama 43 stated that:
Every expression of opinion on matters that are important has the poten-
tiality of inducing action in the interests of one rather than another group
in society. But the group in power . . . may not impose penal sanctions
on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest merely
on a showing that others may thereby be persuaded to take action in-
consistent with its interests.
44
A narrow construction of the proviso, leaving some publicity subject to
possible proscription under (ii) would raise serious constitutional doubts.45
However, the Court's broad interpretation of "products... produced" coupled
with the Board's interpretation of "distributed" should avoid this first amend-
ment problem.
Even with the broadly construed proviso, picketing, specifically excepted
from its scope, would still be subject to subsection (ii) standards. In Fruit
Packers,46 the other case decided under Section 8(b) (4), the' Supreme Court
faced the question whether all picketing by its very nature fell within the
proscription of that subsection. The union, in an effort to win a primary labor
dispute against fruit packers and warehousemen, picketed a chain of Safeway
markets to encourage customers not to buy the primary employers' apples
from Safeway. The primary employers filed a complaint with the NLRB
charging in part that the union's picketing threatened, coerced, and restrained
Safeway in violation of (ii). Although the Board made no finding of an actual
threat, coercion, or restraint, it nevertheless held that the union's picketing
was a per se violation.47 To reach this conclusion, the Board made the ques-
42. In distinguishing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), which upheld a
city ordinance forbidding street distribution of commercial and business advertising mat-
ter, the Supreme Court in Sullivan acknowledged "the constitutional protection for 'the
freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion'" and stated:
The publication here was not a "commercial" advertisement in the sense in which
the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion,
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public
interest and concern.
376 U.S. at 266.
43. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
44. Id. at 104.
45. As the Supreme Court once stated:
[P]ublication, unaccompanied by violence, of a notice that the employer is unfair to
organized labor and requesting the public not to patronize him is an exercise of the
right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment which cannot be made
unlawful by act of Congress.
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 243 (1941).
46. NLRB v. Local 760, Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
47. Local 760, Fruit Packers (Tree Fruits Labor Committee), 132 N.L.R.B. 1172
(1961). The Board was following its holding in prior decisions: Local 261, United Whole-
sale Employees (Perfection Mattress & Spring), 129 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1960), affirmed and
enforced on this point, 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963); Local 61, Upholsterers Union
(Minneapolis House Furnishing), 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961).
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tionable assumption that Congress, by adding the publicity proviso exempt-
ing publicity other than picketing, indicated that all publicity, including picket-
ing, would necessarily have violated (ii). 4 8 Relying on past decisions which
were supported by quotations from legislative debate, this reasoning led to the
conclusion that no finding of fact was necessary to condemn picketing under
(ii). 49 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, agreeing with the
Board's reading of congressional intent, nevertheless reasoned that the lan-
guage of the subsection did not accomplish a per se prohibition of picketing.50
According to the court, since (ii) outlawed conduct threatening, coercing, or
restraining any person, the subsection could only be read as requiring a factual
determination that the conduct in question actually produced those prohibited
effects. Consequently the court remanded the case to the Board for a factual
finding on the effect of the union's picketing of Safeway.5' On appeal the
Supreme Court rejected both interpretations of the statute and construed
legislative history to support its own holding that picketing at the secondary
site, limited to asking consumers not to buy a specific product, did not threat-
en, coerce, or restrain the secondary employer in violation of (ii). 
2
While the distinction draivn by the Court between picketing asking con-
sumers not to buy a specific product and picketing asking them not to trade
at all with the secondary employer may not be unreasonable, it lacks support
48. 132 N.L.R.B. at 1172, 1177.
49. Id. at 1177-78. The Board relied on Minneapolis House Furnishing, supra note
47, at 43-44, 62-64; Perfection Mattress & Sprng, sitpra note 47, at 1022-23.
While various remarks made in Congress indicate that (ii) was thought to prohibit
all secondary picketing, none of the legislators addressed himself to the possible existence
of picketing which in fact does not threate, coerce, or restrain the secondary employer.
The Board assumed that Congress had faced that possibility and had decided to outlaw
even secondary picketing which did not meet the standards of threat, coercion, or re-
straint. If the publicity proviso were necessary because publicity would otherwise be un-
lawful under (ii), the only conclusion which follows is that (ii) would have proscribed
only such publicity which in fact threatens, coerces, or restrains and that publicity with-
out these (ii) characteristics did not need the added protection of the proviso. By statu-
tory language, no activity which does not constitute a threat, coercion, or restraint can
violate (ii). See, e.g., remarks by Senator McClellan, 105 CONG. REc. 6666-67 (1959), 2
LEGIs. HisT. 1193 (1959); remarks by Senator Goldwater, 105 CONG. REc. 6428 and
17904 (1959), 2 LEGIS. HisT. 1192, 1437 (1959) ; remarks by Senator Morse, 105 CONG.
REc. 17882-83 (1959), 2 LEGIS. HisT. 1426-27 (1959) ; remarks by Senator Kennedy, 105
CONG. REC. 17898-99 (1959), 2 LEGis. HIsT. 1432 (1959); remarks by Representative
Griffin, 105 CONG. REC. 15673 (1959), 2 LEGis. HIST. 1615 (1959); analysis by Repre-
sentative Thompson and Senator Kennedy, 105 CONG. Rc. 16590-91 (1959), 2 LEGIs.
Hrss. 1708 (1959).
50. Local 760, Fruit Packers v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Looking solely to the language of the statute, however, we believe the most plausible
reading to be that § 8(b) (4) (ii) outlaws only such conduct (including picketing)
as in fact threatens, coerces, or restrains secondary employers, and that the proviso
is intended to exempt from regulation "publicity other than picketing" even though
it threatens, coerces, or restrains an employer.
Id. at 315.
51. Id. at 318.
52. NLRB v. Local 760, Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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in legislative history. justice Harlan, in dissent,53 established what was also
clear to the Board 54 and the Court of Appeals " - that Congress clearly
thought (ii) prohibited all forms of secondary picketing. Even the legislative
statements used by the majority do not seem to support its conclusion. The
Court, finding particularly significant the fact that product picketing was not
specifically mentioned in the debates by the supporters ", of the bill, drew the
inference that the desire to outlaw picketing evidenced in those debates was
inappli~able to product picketing. 57 Such an inference is justified only if Con-
gress believed the evils flowing from product picketing were significantly less
important than those flowing from picketing directed against the entire busi-
ness of the secondary employer. Otherwise, there would be no reason to read
the word "picketing" in the debates and in the statute as not including one
form of picketing - that directed to products. In referring to the two types of
picketing - product and non-product- the Court makes this same point.
"This is not to say that this distinction was expressly alluded to in the de-
bates. It is to say, however, that the consumer picketing carried on in this
case (product) is not attended by the abuses at which the statute was di-
rected."58 Yet the Court cites no legislative history evidencing that Congress
thought product picketing was not one of the evils to which the statute was
directed. Absent such evidence and in light of the repeated use of the un-
qualified word "picketing" in both the debates and the statute, it would seem
that Congress intended no distinction.
The Court, however, derived from "the history of federal regulation of
labor relations" a presumption against ascribing to Congress the desire to ban
peaceful picketing in the absence of a clear showing that such a ban was in-
tended to eliminate "isolated evil."5 9 While this presumption appears to be
53. 377 U.S. at 80 (1964). See also note 49 supra.
54. 132 N.L.RB. at 1177.
55. 308 F.2d at 317.
56. The court took note of statements by Senators Morse and Humphrey which un-
deniably included product picketing within subsection (ii)'s prohibition, but then stated:
"But we have often, cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance
upon the views of its legislative opponents." 377 U.S. at 66.
57. "The silence on the [part of] sponsors of amendments is pregnant with signifi-
cance since they must have been aware that consumer picketing as such had been held to
be outside the reach of § 8(b) (4)." Id. at 66-67.
58. Id. at 64.
59. Id. at 62-63. As authority for this presumption, the Court cited NLRB v. Local
639, Drivers Union (Curtis), 362 U.S. 274 (1960). In creating the presumption in Cutrtis
Mr. Justice Brennan, also the author of the Fruit Packers opinion, relied in part upon § 13
of the Taft-Hartley Act, which provides that "Nothing in this subchapter, except as
specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or im-
pede or diminish in, any way the right to strike. . . " 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958). The Curtis
case, however, involved primary, not secondary, picketing - the application of the sub-
stantive provisions of the act to minority union picketing for recognition. Viewing picket-
ing as a part of the right to strike, id. at 281 n.9, the Court invoked § 13 as:
a rule of construction which cautions against an, expansive reading ... which would
adversely affect the right to strike, unless the congressional purpose to give it that
meaning persuasively appears either from the structure or history of the statute.
Therefore, § 13 is a command of Congress to the courts to resolve doubts and
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valid, it is of no help to the Court in reading legislative history to determine
the "isolated evils" intended to be eliminated in Section 8(b) (4). The Court
found the evil of peaceful picketing to be its use to persuade customers of the
secondary employer to cease all trading with him.60 But from the legislative
history cited by the Court, it is equally consistent to conclude that the evil
sought to be eliminated was the use of all picketing against the secondary
employer.61 There is, moreover, convincing evidence, not cited by either the
majority or the dissent, that an isolated evil of primary concern to Congress
was the coercion of the secondary employer.6 2 And as the Court admitted,
both product and non-product picketing may have a coercive effect.6 3 Thus
even with the presumption, the Court's use of legislative history is uncon-
vincing.
To justify the distinction between product and non-product consumer picket-
ing, the Court forwarded the theory that product picketing is merely an ex-
pansion of the primary dispute to a secondary situs through a following of
the product,6 4 while non-product picketing "creates a separate dispute with
the secondary employer."'6 5 Recognizing that this analysis in terms of the
remoteness of the picketing from the primary dispute was nowhere mentioned
in the legislative history of the section, 66 the Court imputed this reasoning to
ambiguities in favor of... the right to strike as understood prior to the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Id. at 282.
While the use of § 13 to create the presumption might be justified, its use would not
seem to be correct in the case of picketing at secondary sites, for it would be directly con-
trary to congressional efforts in §§ 8(b) (4) and 8(e) (outlawing "hot cargo" agree-
ments) to limit labor disputes to the primary employer's business and to isolate those
employers not directly involved. In addition, such a use of § 13 could have ramifications
in the area of common, situs picketing. See text accompanying and following note 71 infra.
See also note 72 infra. For a criticism of the Court's use of § 13 in the Curtis situation,
see Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLum. L. Rv. 1363, 1398-
1403 (1962).
60. 377 U.S. at 63.
61. The Court cites an example of picketing which President Eisenhower gave on a
televised speech and which Senator Goldwater said was prohibited by subsection (ii) : a
union in a labor dispute with a furniture manufacturer "Instead of picketing the furniture
plant itself . . . picket[s] the stores which sell the furniture." Id. at 65-66 n.10.
62. See, e.g., remarks by Senator Goldwater, 105 CoNG. REc. 1281, 1283 (1959), 2
LEis. HIST. 977, 979 (1959); remarks by Senator Curtis, 105 CONG. REc. 1296, 6670
(1959), 2 LEGIs. HIsT. 989, 1197 (1959); statement by Secretary of Labor Mitchell,
105 CONG. REc. 1729-30 (1959), 2 LEGIS. HiST. 993-94 (1959); remarks by Senator
McClellan, 105 CoNG. REc. 6666-67 (1959), 2 LEGIs. HisT. 1193 (1959); remarks by
Representative Bosch, 105 CONG. REc. 1426 (1959), 2 LEGis. HisT. 1462 (1959) ; remarks
by Representative LaFore, 105 CONG. REc. 3927-28 (1959), 2 LEGIs. HIST. 1470-71
(1959) ; analysis by Representative Griffin, 105 CONG. REc. 14347 (1959), 2 LEGIs. HIST.
1523 (1959).
63. 377 U.S. at 71.
64. 'When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers not to buy
the struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute." Id. at
72.
65. Ibid.
66. See, e.g., quotation in text at note 58 supra.
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Congress by arguing that the distinction "was well established in the state
cases by 1940. ' '67 Although the Court recognized that this theory of following
the product was based primarily on a "unity of interest" between the primary
and secondary employer, it failed to recognize, as did later state cases, that
the logical extension of the unity of interest concept would also validate some
non-product picketing and would destroy the very dichotomy created by the
Court in Fruit Packers. Thus the New York Court of Appeals, the author of
the leading product picketing case cited by the Court,6 8 reasoned in 1941 that
the basis of the unity of interest between the primary and secondary employers
was their continuing business relationship; a union, therefore, might picket
a store utilizing only services, not products of the primary employer to induce
consumers to withdraw all patronage. 69
The Court's assimilation of product picketing to the primary dispute, how-
ever, might be read not as an interpretation of congressional intent, but rather
as placing product picketing outside of the scope of 8(b) (4) entirely. In the
past opinions the Court has recognized the all-embracing language of Section
8(b) (4), and has interpreted the section to apply only to secondary activity;
this reasoning is now codified in the proviso to Section 8(b) (4) (B) exempt-
ing primary activity from the scope of the section.70 But the expansion of the
concept of primary dispute to encompass product picketing may run counter
to the rationale of many cases involving common situs picketing. In these
cases the courts and the Board, in an effort to balance the effectiveness of union
strikes against injury to secondary employers, have permitted primary picket-
ing at secondary or common sites only when no adequate opportunity was
available to picket at the primary site.rl The interpretation of product picket-
ing as closely related to the primary dispute might therefore be read as elimi-
nating the "no adequate opportunity" restriction and as extending the primary
situs doctrines to include the following of products as well as employees. On
the other hand, the Court may have meant only to suggest that the concept of
primary dispute involved in product picketing was different from the concept
.67. 377 U.S. at 64 n.7.
68. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937).
69. People v. Muller, 286 N.Y. 281, 36 N.E.2d 206 (1941). See note 35 supra.
70. LMRDA § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542-43 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 8(b) (4) (B) (Supp.
IV, 1963). See, e.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 685-90 (1951);
Local 761, IBEW v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1961).
.71. See, e.g., Sailors' Union (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950);
Brewery Drivers (Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works), 107 N.L.R.B. 299, enforced
220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955). These and cases following them "make clear the Board's
view that secondary site picketing was lawful only if no adequate opportunity to picket
at the primary site were present." Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62
CoLum. L. REv. 1362, 1379 (1962).
The rationale of the common, situs picketing rules is that the picketing is aimed at the
primary employees and that the only meaningful way to get at them is at the secondary
site. The countervailing consideration, is the factual inference that secondary site picket-
ing is aimed in part at least at the secondary employees. But this inference is invalid if
in fact there is no other real way to get to the primary employees. Id. at 1379-80.
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involved in following primary employees to a common situs. Even if the
Court's opinion is read only to effect this less radical change in current doc-
trine concerning the nature of primary activity, this new concept of primary
activity was not clearly articulated by the Court; the economic analysis for-
warded by the Court appears to be addressed to the problem of "threat,
coercion or restraint," although this effect would be immaterial if product
picketing were considered to fall within the proviso exempting primary ac-
tivity and thus beyond the reach of the section. It seems unlikely, moreover,
that the Court meant to advance a new doctrine of primary activity by im-
plication without any explicit discussion of the reasoning and ramifications be-
hind its departure. For this reason, it appears that the Court may have seized
upon the analysis of the proximity of product picketing to the primary dispute
in an effort to support its finding of an isolated evil without considering the
full implications of the rationale.
72
The Court further justified its distinction between product and non-product
picketing by analyzing the economic consequences of the two forms of picket-
ing. The Court concluded that successful product picketing would decrease the
secondary employer's purchases from the primary employer "only because the
public has diminished its purchases of the struck product ;,,73 a total con-
sumer boycott of the secondary employer would, however, decrease the pur-
chases from the primary employer because of "pressure designed to inflict in-
jury on his business generally."74 Mr. Justice Harlan in dissent demonstrated
the disutility of this economic analysis by citing the example of an independent
gas station owner who purchases all his gasoline from a struck refinery.75
It makes little difference to him or to the union whether the pickets ask the
public not to buy the gasoline products he sells, or not to buy anything from
him. While asking the public not to buy X gasoline is technically product
picketing, in substance it creates the isolated evil thought by the Court to be
prohibited by Congress in the statute - the use of picketing "to persuade the
customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in order to
force him to cease dealing with . . .the primary employer. ' 7 In substance a
difficult problem of classification is created. In each instance a court may have
to determine whether the product constitutes so substantial a proportion of
the secondary employer's business that picketing of that product would be
tantamount to asking consumers not to deal at all with the employer.
72. Even if the Court did consider product picketing to be primary in nature, its
use of § 13 of Taft-Hartley from NLRB v. Local 639, Drivers Union (Curtis), 362 U.S.
274 (1960), see note 59 supra, in reading legislative history would be unjustified. In
Fruit Packers the Court, if it used § 13, used it to create an ambiguity in the meaning of
the word "picketing" in the debate; on the other hand, in Curtis the Court found no clear
evidence of congressional intent either to ban or not to ban picketing, because the House
version of the Taft-Hartley Act, expressly banning picketing to gain recognition, was not
adopted by the Conference Committee. The presumption drawn from § 13 was then applied
only after the legislative history had indicated an ambiguity.
73. 377 U.S. at 72.
74. Ibid.
75. Id. at 83.
76. Id. at 63.
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The result reached by the Court may, however, be explained as an attempt
to avoid the first amendment questions raised by a broad ban on peaceful
picketing. 77 If this was the Court's aim, its decision probably extended more
prbtection to product picketing than would be required by the first amendment.
While the Court in the landmark case of Thornbill v. Alabama 78 recognized
that "the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute
must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by
the Constitution," 79 recent cases have permitted prohibition of peaceful picket-
ing in the pursuit of valid public policies. Justice Black, concurring in Fruit
Packers, states these valid policies to be: (1) keeping the streets clear for the
movement of people and property, (2) promoting the public safety, peace,
comfort, or convenience, and (3) protecting people from violence and breaches
of the peace.80 He neglects to state, however, that in a large number of cases
upholding bans on picketing the Court considered as a valid public policy the
prevention of coercion. These cases would seem to indicate that if picketing
actually coerced secondary employers, it could be constitutionally prohibited
pursuant to the valid public policy of preventing coercion of secondary em-
ployers. If product picketing fell within the standards of (ii) in any given
situation, there would then appear to be no constitutional reason to exempt
it from prohibition.8 '
On the other hand, the Court's attempt to justify exclusion of product
picketing from (ii) on the basis of legislative intent, might create a first
amendment question by establishing a per se rule against non-product picket-
ing: "picketing which persuades the customers of a secondary employer to
stop all trading with him was ... to be barred."8' 2 While it is likely that most
non-product picketing will in fact "threaten, coerce, or restrain," there might
be some instances in which it will not. In such a case, prohibition of the
picketing involved would not be pursuant to a valid public policy; rather, as
Justice Black stated in his concurring opinion, "the result is an abridgment
of the freedom of these picketers to tell a part of the public their side of a labor
77. The Court, after describing its "isolated evils" presumption in interpreting stat-
utes restricting the right to picket stated:
Both the congressional policy and our adherence to this principle of interpretation
reflect concern that a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide with the
guarantees of the First Amendment.
377 U.S. at 63.
78. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
79. Id. at 102.
80. 377 U.S. at 78.
81. While the state statutes and common law prohibiting picketing took the form
of laws regulating restraint of trade, labor relations, or race relations, the Supreme Court
was always careful to note that the picketing involved always contained an element of
coercion or compulsion. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949) ; Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) ; Building Service Employees
v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Local 10, Plumbers Union v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192
(1953) ; Local 695, Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
82. 377 U.S. at 71.
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controversy, a subject the free discussion of which is protected by the First
Amendment."
8 3
The Court, however, might have avoided the first amendment problem by
adopting the Court of Appeals' reading of (ii), construing the subsection to
prohibit all picketing, product or non-product, which in fact threatened,
coerced, or restrained a secondary employer.s 4 This reading of (ii) seems to
be within the constitutional line of demarcation established in previous picket-
ing cases; only conduct accomplishing the evil of actual coercion - a valid
object of public policy 8 15 - would be banned. This interpretation, moreover,
would not seem to violate congressional intent. Not only is there evidence
that Congress itself considered the primary evil to be the actual coercion of
secondary employers,80 but the section itself is structured in this way. Since
the publicity proviso does not extend to picketing, it merely leaves the status
of such conduct to be measured by (ii) standards; subsection (ii) does not
ban all picketing, but only that conduct which constitutes a threat, coercion,
or restraint. Accepting, however, the Supreme Court's distinction between
product and non-product picketing, the Board or a court might still utilize
the Court of Appeals' construction of subsection (ii) 87 to avoid first amend-
ment doubts concerning the ban on non-product picketing. To accomplish this,
only that non-product picketing found to actually threaten, coerce, or restrain
would be prohibited under subsection (ii).
A final issue present but unrecognized in the Fruit Packers and Servette
opinions is the problem of distinguishing between picketing and "publicity,
other than picketing." Since non-product picketing is subjected to prohibition
under (ii) by the Court's decision in Fruit Packers and since all publicity
other than picketing is protected by the proviso under the Servette decision,
the distinction between types of publicity becomes important in cases involving
non-product publicity. A serious problem of classification may be present with
respect to the increasingly popular labor tactic of handbilling. Handbilling -
typically the stationary distribution of leaflets describing the union's primary
dispute at the entrances of the secondary employer's premises - has been used
more frequently in recent years to avoid the high cost of mass media advertis-
ing and to localize appeal to those most likely to patronize the secondary em-
ployer.88 While this tactic was employed in Servette, the Court assumed with-
out discussion that it was not picketing.89 Although handbilling is similar to
83. Id. at 79.
84. Local 760, Fruit Packers v. NLRB, 308 F2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See discussion
at note 50 supra. This is not to say, however, that the Supreme Court should, as the
Court of Appeals intimated, have required actual economic harm to the secondary em-
ployer before finding a threat, coercion, or restraint. See 377 U.S. at 71-72.
85. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 62 supra.
87. See text at note 50 supra. See also note 84 supra.
88. See, e.g., Waldman, Problems of the Boycott - A Labor Viewpoint, N.Y.U. 14TH
CoNF. oN LAB. 47, 66-67 (1961).
89. NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
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picketing,90 since both are conducted at or near the secondary employer's
premises, the two often differ in several important respects. Handbilling is
normally stationary rather than ambulatory. One or more members marching
back and forth in front of a store command greater attention and interfere
more with passers-by than persons standing still near entrances. Handbilling,
moreover, involves small leaflets instead of large placards. The former are less
conspicuous and less likely to incite secondary employees to stop work than
the latter. And handbilling, like mass media advertising, seems better adapted
to "truthfully advising the public" than does picketing. Finally, handbilling
was specifically mentioned as a protected activity by Senator Kennedy, leader
of the Senate conferees responsible for drafting the proviso. 91 In spite of these
considerations, there may be instances in which distribution of leaflets should
be considered picketing. For example, the distribution may involve persons
patrolling the secondary employer's establishment, or large numbers of people
distributing leaflets may block entrances and impede entry or exit of em-
ployees and customers. 92 Such activity, if it is non-product and in fact threat-
ens, coerces, or restrains the secondary employer, should be held to violate
subsection (ii). Thus, the decision in many cases would seem to depend upon
the character of the union activity involved, rather than the label conventionally
attached. In distinguishing between picketing and handbilling, the Board or
court would be skirting a potential first amendment issue. Picketing has been
found subject to regulation under the first amendment because of its speech-
plus characteristics - its historical connection with industrial strife and its
physical aspects such as endangering public safety or obstruction of public
traffic. 93 To avoid the possible first amendment issue, handbilling should be
placed within the scope of the publicity proviso except in the case where it
clearly partakes of the speech-plus characteristics traditionally associated with
picketing.
DENNIs G. SEINFELD
90. Two state court decisions have equated handbilling with picketing under state
anti-picketing statutes. Mason & Dixon, Lines, Inc. v. Odom, 193 Ga. 471, 18 S.E.2d 841
(1942) ; Kitty Kelly Shoe Corp. v. Local 108, United Retail Employees, 125 N.J. Eq. 250,
5 A.2d 682 (1939). In addition, three federal district courts have held handbilling to con-
stitute prohibited conduct under (ii), but none of the opinions elaborated its reasoning or
mentioned the publicity proviso. Shore v. Local 712, International Bhd. of Electrical Work-
ers, 48 L.R.R.M. 2231 (W.D. Pa. 1961) ; Potter v. Local 142, Plumbers Union, 192 F. Supp.
641 (W.D. Tex. 1960); Phillips v. Local 662, Radio & Television Engineers (E.D. Tenn.
1960), unpublished but cited in Potter v. Plant Guard Workers, 47 L.R.R.M. 2804, 2807
(S.D. Tex. 1961).
91. 105 CoNG. RPc. 17898-99 (1959), 2 LEGIs. HIsT. 1432 (1959). See quotations in
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